I
N the continuing debate about the role of money, credit, and monetary policy in our society, one of the major issues centers around the specific incidence of "tight money" on individual business firms. On the one hand, leading proponents of monetary controls as a regulatory device have emphasized the general, impersonal nature of such controls. They have argued that the impact of monetary policy is determined by the reaction of individual borrowers to changed market conditions.
On the other hand, critics of general controls have suggested that institutional changes have led to discrimination by suppliers in the market for money and credit. Differences in size of firm, market structure, or type of industry, the amount of liquid assets which firms may accumulate, imperfections in the capital markets, and a variety of other institutional phenomena have been offered as reasons for the failure of monetary policy to operate as a general, impersonal, control device. Some of these institutional restrictions have been summarized under the general heading of "credit rationing."
Both conjecture and empirical observation of the structure of bank loans have suggested that credit rationing favors large firms. 1 But those who suggest that this is the case ignore important institutional arrangements that work in the opposite direction. Banks and financial institutions are not the only sources of credit for small firms. The existence of a large volume of interfirm (mercantile) credit makes it apparent that business firms borrow from each other. 2 Variations in the volume and distribution of mercantile credit are important accompaniments of monetary policy changes. During the recent tight money period, for example, the increase in mercantile credit by the manufacturing sector was three times larger than the increase in the money supply (currency plus adjusted demand deposits).
We show below that, when money was tightened, firms with relatively large cash balances increased the average length of time for which credit was extended. And this extension of trade credit appears to have favored these firms against whom credit rationing is said to discriminate. Hence the credit provided by banks and financial institutions seems to have been redistributed to restore much of the general, impersonal nature of monetary controls during 1955-57. Moreover, the reduction in cash balances by liquid firms helps to explain the increase in the income velocity of money during the recent tight money period.
The following section examines the relationship between a measure of monetary tightness and the liquidity of manufacturing firms of varying size. Section II discusses the important factors influencing the allocation of trade credit. Section III points out differences in the sources and allocation of funds for large and small firms during 1955-57 and compares the impor- The use of receivables to reallocate credit implies that some firms have access to funds which can be made available for this purpose. Information on recent periods indicates that large firms were able to obtain proportionally greater access to funds than were small firms. 3 One obvious source of such funds is the commercial banking system. Others are the capital markets, insurance companies, and financial intermediaries. A further source of funds comes from the liquid assets which the lending firm holds at the time that the decision is made to increase or allow the additional extension of credit to customers.
Define liquidity position, or stock of liquidity, afs the ratio of cash plus government securities to current liabilities, a variant of the "quick" or "acid test" ratio commonly used by businessmen and accountants. 4 Indications that the average liquidity position of firms increases monotonically with size of firms have been used to suggest that large firms are not affected by changes in monetary policy. But such a proposition ignores (i) the way in which liquidity responds to changes in the money market, and (2) the way in which the larger firms may increase the extension of mercantile credit when their sales to small customers are falling. Hence, we can not assume that large size or relatively high liquidity results in firms acting as if the restriction of credit has not taken place.
The money market variable, M, is defined as the product of the rate of interest and an index of tight money. 5 Liquidity positron, or stock of liquidity, L, is measured, as above, by the ratio of cash plus government securities to current liabilities. 6 Table 1 shows the results obtained from a linear regression equation of the money market variable, M, on L. All groups show that liquidity position was relatively low during periods of monetary tightness and relatively high durperiods of easy money. 7 There is some tendency for the marginal effect of M to increase with size. This is particularly true for the groups with assets less than ten million dollars. However, with the exception of Groups I and II, differences between size groups are small. Despite this indication that the marginal effect of M on L is rather independent of size, we should recall that the largest group has by far the largest absolute amount of cash, government securities, and current liabilities. The largest dollar amount of funds is therefore released by the group with assets of $100 million and over.
While the money supply increased by less 6 Operationally, the interest rate is measured by the end of quarter rate of interest on new issues of Treasury bills. The ratio of free reserves to total reserves in central reserve city and reserve city banks at the end of each quarter is used as a measure of the "tightness of money." Since a negative value indicates that excess reserves are borrowed from the Fed, this ratio is subtracted from 1.00 to obtain an index of monetary tightness. (Thus, negative free reserves increase quarterly observations for the rate of interest, and positive free reserves decrease them.) The seasonally adjusted value of the product of these two variables is referred to as the "money market variable" in the text. This is one of many measures which might be chosen. It has the advantage of combining both the interest rate and a measure of the availability of loans. than $1 billion for the tight money period, the sample as a whole shows a decrease in cash plus government securities of more than $5 billion. 8 Table 2 shows the relative share of total liquid assets (cash plus governments) held by different size groups on various dates during the recent tight money period.
It is unlikely that discrimination in favor of large firiris and against small firms would make the results (shown in Table 2 ) a consequence of general monetary controls. Moreover, to the extent that a reduction in liquid assets represents a significant proportion of the assets available for increasing receivables, the largest firms were in a position to allocate the assets thus released into an increase in their holdings of accounts and notes receivable. 9 8 More than 80 per cent of the decrease represents the experience of the group of largest firms. Groups I, II, and III do not show any relative decline in total liquid assets held. The groups of smallest firms show the largest absolute increase in liquid asset holdings. 9 To some extent, it may be suggested that an inability to separate industries by size of total assets weakens this conclusion. This is, of course, more likely to be the case for the intermediate groups where differences in industry group may have led to a cancelling of positive and negative changes and where "large" and "small" may need redefinition in terms of the industry. Our largest group may be
IL Factors Influencing Allocation of Trade Credit
If the suppliers of firms affected by credit rationing respond to a decrease in the demand for their product by increasing the ratio of accounts plus notes receivable to sales, a reallocation of assets and credit occurs. 10 Even if the extension of credit terms results from action initiated by the customer, the effect on the balance sheets will be the same. In either case, employees of the lending firm responsible for financial operations must make a decision: in effect they must decide to collect the outstanding receivables more aggressively and refuse to ship additional orders to delinquent accounts, or, by default, permit the average collection period to lengthen.
For large firms increased credit extension is a relatively inexpensive method of maintaining or increasing sales when credit rationing acts to the potential disadvantage of their customers. 11 And the lending firm may sell both to firms which do and do not borrow. Hence, extended credit terms need not be granted to all customers 12 further reducing the cost to the lender. 13 biased by its industrial composition, but whatever its industry composition, it is clear that such firms are large, hold a substantial proportion of the liquid assets of manufacturing corporations, and experienced a substantial reduction in such holdings during the tight money period. 10 For the lending firm, receivables are higher and liquid assets are lower than when stated invoice terms are followed; for the borrower, payables and liquid assets are increased.
n Assuming a rate of interest of twelve per cent per annum as the opportunity cost of funds to the lending firm, the granting of a ninety day payment period in lieu of the "regular" thirty day terms is equivalent in cost to a 2 per cent reduction in the selling price of the product. The use of interest bearing notes to finance receivables will, of course, reduce the cost to the lender.
The smaller (borrowing) firms, unable to obtain funds from banks, will value the resulting possibility of holding higher inventories at the marginal profit rate resulting from additional sales. For the borrowers, the alternative presented in this way is less costly or more flexible than other prominently available alternatives: selling accounts receivable to factoring companies, large percentage reductions in inventory, loss of control of the firm.
u The Robinson-Patman Act specifically prohibits differential treatment of this kind with respect to pricing practices.
"The extent to which the average collection period is practiced as a form of non-price competition aids in understanding the degree to which so-called "administered" prices are in fact more flexible than they appear if only announced changes in market prices are considered. • Detail may not add to total because of rounding.
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Define the net mercantile credit position, R, of a firm or group as the ratio of the total outstanding accounts and notes receivable, r, minus the outstanding accounts and notes payable, p, shown on the quarterly balance sheet to the dollar amount of quarterly sales, s. Then we define (r -p)/s = R, the ratio of net receivables to sales.
Firms with the largest average liquidity position are shown by the scatter diagrams to be more likely to have relatively low liquidity position accompanying relatively high ratios of net receivables to sales. 14 Moreover, given that they are both larger and on the average more "For groups I, II, and III, the scatter diagrams give no evidence of a negative relationship between R and L; for the two groups of largest firms, the negative slopes of the simple regression lines which we would draw are considerably clearer. where R and L are defined as before, 5 is an index of seasonally adjusted sales (first quarter 1951 = 1.00), a and b are parameters, and u is a random variable. Obviously, once the interrelationships between firms are considered, the effects of L and S on R are no longer completely independent. However, the partial correlation coefficients show that the two effects are not closely related for all size groups. Table   15 This effect has been previously noted in a discussion of recent British experience. H. F. Lydall; "The Impact of the Credit Squeeze on Small and Medium Sized Manufacturing Firms," Economic Journal, LXVH (September i957)> 428-29. However, Lydall does not consider the relationships between firms and the way in which the reduction in liquidity by the large firms may succeed in reducing the credit rationing effect of a tight money policy for the small firms. At the same time, the large firms, by lending, may limit or reverse the accompanying reduction in their sales.
3 presents these coefficients obtained when equation (i) was used to estimate the relationship for each of the seven size groups. 16 Groups which experienced the largest dollar decline in liquid assets (Table 2) have the strongest negative relationships between L and R m Table 3 . Of these, only Group VII shows a positive relation between S and R. 17 Thus, net receivables for this group should rise faster than sales and by a larger amount than for any other group. To the extent that a reallocation 57 and 1954-57-But the positive coefficients between R and S (Table 3) are biased downward. When credit terms lengthen, all firms do not obtain the same terms. Credit is allocated among customers and sales are increased by financing inventories for firms which might otherwise be unable to purchase or which might purchase smaller amounts. Since many customers will continue to observe stated invoice terms and since we know only the average net receivables-sales ratio, the increase in R shown in .86 60
M3
Figures in parentheses are standard errors. 1 AM^Jf^^i «to«?«* ** the ratio r/s is substituted for (r-* Adjusted for degrees of freedom.
of credit takes place, it is the largest firms which should be the principal lenders.
With the exception of Group II, 18 Table 3 will reflect only partially the increased lending by suppliers to their customers.
HL Changes in Sourccs and Allocation of Funds
The estimates of equation (1) suggest that firms with the largest assets are more likely to increase trade credit faster than sales when increases in credit are restricted by monetary policy. Here we contrast the experience of the three groups of smallest and the two groups of largest firms to estimate the magnitude of relative and absolute changes in sales, net receivables, and other sources and allocation of funds. Consideration of the major sources of funds and the differences between groups of large and small firms indicates the extent to which interfirm "lending" reallocated credit. 19
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Date the start of the tight money period in either the second quarter or fourth quarter 1955; consider the third quarter 1957 as the end of tight money. From either second or fourth quarter 1955 to third quarter 1957, only Groups VI and VII show a larger proportion of the increase in net receivables than of the increase in sales. 20 Moreover, the increase in net receivables by Group VII was greater than the increase in short-term loans by banks to all manufacturing firms.
Clearly, changes in the amount of trade credit extended are of importance in understanding the operations of the credit system during this period. The non-manufacturing sectors were able to "borrow" $5)4 billion in additional trade credit from the manufacturing sector. This amount exceeds the increase in aggregate loans (short-term plus long-term) which the manufacturing sector received from banks; moreover, it exceeds the total increase in currency plus adjusted demand deposits during these quarters (1.2 billion).
Assertions that the proportion of total bank credit which the smallest firms obtained during 1956-57 are evidence of discrimination against small firms ignore the relatively large share of such credits which the group obtained in the months immediately preceding. 21 However, the share of short-term loans from banks which Group I obtained was relatively small. But, their relatively large increase in cash plus government securities and their ability to obtain longer term credit from both banks and non-banks may be both an indication of their preferences during this period and a denial that monetary policy favored large firms. 21 From second quarter 1955 through third quarter 1957, Group I increased long-term loans from banks and nonbanks by slightly more than they increased assets or their share of the stock of assets. 22 The group of smallest firms emerges as the only group which increased its relative sales position and its dollar holdings of cash and government securities. During the relatively prosperous period accompanying tight money, this group substantially increased its share of sales. Though they have the smallest proportion of total sales, their increase in sales was larger than the increase for any group other than Group VII. At the same time, they increased The principal sources of funds for the group of largest firms were the non-bank markets for long-term debt and the market for equity. 28 But the absolute increase in new funds which the group obtained from banks was less than the increase in net receivables; the "loans" extended to their customers exceeded their new borrowings from banks. 24 Consideration of sources of funds gives little indication that the banking system discriminated sharply against the smallest firms in the manufacturing sector. In addition, the data make clear (1) that the total dollar volume of net receivables and inventory increased substantially during the period and (2) that firms with total assets of $100 million and above increased their relative and absolute share of both. Furthermore, the data indicate (3) that non-bank sources were the principal suppliers of credit to the largest firms and (4) A similar result occurs when we consider increases m inventory. For Group VII, the seasonally adjusted ratio of inventory to sales increased from 0.66 to 0.77 between second quarter 1955 and third quarter 1957. For Groups I and II, the inventory-sales ratio fell during the period. It is likely that increases in inventory by large firms were an additional source of financial aid to smaller firms. By holding larger inventories for their customers, larger firms are able to make more rapid deliveries. Faster deliveries reduce the demand to hold inventory and the demand for workmg capital loans by their customers.
facturing corporations were important suppliers of credit to non-manufacturing firms.
When money market conditions change, a first approximation to the extent of possible differences in the effect of monetary policy on large and small firms may be obtained from 2m analysis of changes in the allocation of credit by the financial system. However, a more complete investigation which considers the impact of monetary controls on groups of firms stratified by size shows that the largest firms in the manufacturing sector reallocate the stock of credit made available by banks and financial institutions. The reallocation of credit and the release of previously held liquid assets appears to restore much of the general nature of monetary controls.
IV. Limitations
Certain disadvantages are inherent in the approach. There are numerous problems both with respect to reliability and comparability associated with the use of the FTC-SEC sample. There is no apparent way to separate the effects associated with type of industry or product classification from effects of size. Changes in the sample composition, which occur annually, limit confidence in comparisons over time. These differences are not unimportant and may impart biases of which we are unaware. In particular, there are sampling problems associated with the smallest group of firms which render precise interpretations difficult. 25 A more fundamental problem occurs with respect to the inferences which may be drawn from these results. It would be desirable to know whether the initiative for the type of lending which we have described results from actions undertaken by the customer or the supplier, whether industry structure, relative size of customer liquidity position, or absolute size of lending firm is more important as a criterion for credit extension. It is extremely difficult to draw inferences from aggregate data about the way in which decisions are made by individual firms. Hence, such inferences must be regarded as an indication of the types of dif-88 This should not be construed as a criticism of the FTC-SEC procedures. Users of these data are aware of the high standards set and the high percentage of response obtained.
ferences which might exist if we investigated individual firms and attempted to formulate empirically testable propositions about the way in which they behave.
Finally, there are limitations in the coverage of this study. Data are available for the manufacturing sector only. More detailed study of the behavior of firms engaged in wholesaling and retailing must be omitted. Data are not available for industry groups stratified by size. Thus, while we might infer, e.g., that the manufacturing sector as a whole extended credit to the wholesaling and retailing sectors, the size or industry classification of firms receiving these credits is unknown.
V. Conclusion
There has been much discussion and little investigation of the way in which changes in monetary policy influence the behavior of firms. 26 In part, the controversy in this area stems from the inadequacy of the present theory of the firm to cope with the reactions of firms to changing money market conditions or to provide precise quantitative predictions of the short-run behavior of firms. Both balance sheet and income statement variables 27 must be included to obtain reasonably accurate predictions of short-run behavior. Even limited use of such variables may improve social policy propositions by providing sufficient information about the units over which we aggregate.
Data for the tight money period of 1955-57 suggest that the banking system increased (the sum of short and long-term) loans to the various size groups in the manufacturing sector in rough correspondence to the share of total assets held by the group. Undoubtedly, it was 28 For example, Professor Baumol recently advised that he would be surprised if an investigation shows that monetary and fiscal controls "constantly favor the one group [oligopoly] against the other [competitive] ." His argument is based on the proposition that "Oligopolists seek, to maximize sales for some fixed profit level. The result of the 'tight money* will decrease sales and hence the reduction in the demand for his product and the increase in his cost will lead the oligopolist to reduce output." 
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easier for large firms to obtain non-bank funds. This alone would seem to indicate that a tight money policy discriminates primarily against smaller, less liquid firms. Consideration of interfirm relationships modifies this result and implies that institutional restrictions which limit the general nature of monetary controls are, at least in part, offset.
We have argued that firms which accumulate liquid balances in periods of easy money use these balances to provide trade credit during periods of tight money. (These "loans" were an important source of credit to non-manufacturing firms.) But reductions in the cash balances of the largest firms during tight money contribute to a rise in velocity. Studies of individual firm behavior may indicate that there is a level of liquidity below which such firms would prefer reduced sales to further increases in receivables and a further drop in cash balances. If such a limit can be reached, the increase in velocity which stems from this source may be slowed or stopped. If so, relatively large increases in monetary tightness would be proportionally more restrictive than small increases.
Finally, we suggest that large (relatively liquid) firms may use credit policy, as an alternative to direct price reductions, to increase sales during periods of tight money. Confirmation of these results should be of considerable interest in discussions of administered prices. Such investigation may, at the same time, indicate a way in which firms evade or avoid the restrictions imposed by the Robinson-Patman Act.
